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Applying a Strict Discovery Rule to Art
Stolen in the Past
by
TARQUIN PREZIOSI'
Introduction
There is a great deal of confusion both within and among jurisdic-
tions as to when and how the statute of limitations for an action to recover
stolen art begins to run. This Note proposes both a retrospective and a
prospective solution to the inherent problems in determining when an ac-
tion to recover stolen art is barred by the statute of limitations. Art that
was stolen in the past would be subject to a "strict" discovery rule-one
which does not focus on the true owner's "due diligence"-so that the
statute of limitations will not begin to run until the owner becomes aware
of the identity of the possessor of the artwork. Future victims of art theft,
in accordance with both current practices in the art world and academic
proposals, would be required to register their stolen works with an art
theft database in order to toll the statute of limitations. Objects which are
not subject to effective registration would be exempt from the registration
requirement, and subject to the-strict discovery rule.
In a typical scenario, an artwork is stolen and subsequently sold to a
collector, the bona fide purchaser, who thinks 'that he or she is gaining
valid title to the piece. At some point, the -victim of the theft, the true
owner, discovers the artwork's whereabouts, and demands its return.
The court must then determine if and when the applicable statute of limi-
tations began to run. Since courts often face unclear or conflicting prece-
dent, owners of stolen art have no clear guidance as to how they can toll
the statute of limitations and thus protect their rights to the artwork.
While the problems of art theft remain a constant from jurisdiction to ju-
risdiction, the solutions vary both between and within jurisdictions.1 Suc-
cess or failure in an art replevin action may be dictated more by the
* J.D. Candidate, 1998, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.
Anthropology, 1993, University of California, Los Angeles. I would like to thank Professor
Richard B. Cunningham for commenting on various drafts of this Note, and Aim6e Preziosi for
her support.
1. See discussion infra Part H.A.2-3.
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choice of forum than the merits of a given case. A variety of academic2
and legislative3 solutions have been offered to deal with art theft. Recent
proposals, responding to current practice in the art world, have called for
the utilization of an international theft or title registry4 for art and cultural
property' in order to more equitably distribute the risks between true
owners and bona fide purchasers.6 This Note focuses on dealing with the
great number of objects which fall outside of the feasible scope of such a
2. See, e.g., Robin Morris Collin, The Law and Stolen Art, Artifacts, and Antiquities, 36
How. L.J. 17 (1993); Stephen L. Foutty, Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v.
Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.: Entrenchment of the Due Diligence Requirement in Re-
plevin Actions for Stolen Art, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1839 (1990); Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse
Possession of Personal Property, 37 BuFF. L. REV. 119 (1989); Ashton Hawkins et al., A Tale
of Two Innocents: Creating an Equitable Balance Between the Rights of Former Owners and
Good Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 49 (1995); Alexandre A. Montagu,
Recent Cases on the Recovery of Stolen Art-The Tug of War Between Owners and Good Faith
Purchasers Continues, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 75 (1993-94); Steven A. Bibas, Note,
The Case Against Statutes of Limitations for Stolen Art, 103 YALE L.J. 2437 (1994); Lisa J.
Borodkin, Note, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed Legal Alternative, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 377 (1995); Steven F. Grover, Note, The Need For Civil-Law Nations to
Adopt Discovery Rules in Art Replevin Actions: A Comparative Study, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1431
(1992); Andrea E. Hayworth, Note, Stolen Artwork: Deciding Ownership is No Pretty Picture,
43 DuKE L.J. 337 (1993); Paige L. Margules, Note, International Art Theft and the Illegal Im-
port and Export of Cultural Property: A Study of Relevant Values, Legislation, and Solutions,
15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 609 (1992); Julia A. McCord, Note, The Strategic Targeting
of Diligence: A New Perspective on Stemming the Illicit Trade in Art, 70 IND. L.J. 985 (1995);
Charles D. Webb, Jr., Whose Art is it Anyway? Title Disputes and Resolution in Art Theft
Cases, 79 KY. L.J. 883 (1991).
3. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c) (West Supp. 1996) (three year statute of
limitations for recovery of items of "interpretive, scientific, or artistic significance"). Re-
sponding to the problems inherent in recovering art that was lost before and during World War
II, Representative Nita Lowey (D-N.Y.) plans to introduce legislation allowing American citi-
zens to sue in federal court to recover artwork abroad that was stolen during the Holocaust. See
Larry Lipman, Jewish Group Seeks Return of Stolen Art, ATLANTA J., Sept. 5, 1997, at A9.
Most existing legislation deals with archaeological artifacts or cultural property excavated or
exported in violation of United States or foreign laws. See, e.g., National Stolen Property Act,
19 U.S.C. §§ 2314, 2315 (1988); Pre-Columbian Monumental and Architectural Sculpture and
Mural Statute, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095 (1972) (prohibiting importation of pre-Columbian arti-
facts into the United States without an export authorization certificate); Archaeological Re-
sources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C.S. § 470 ee (West Supp. 1997) (prohibiting the trafficking in
archaeological resources excavated or sold in violation of state law).
4. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
5. The terms "art" and "cultural property" are not subject to any precise definition. For
simplicity, these terms can perhaps best be used to refer to objects that "have artistic, ethno-
graphic, archaeological, or historical value." John H. Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin
Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1881, 1888 (1985). The terms are neither inclusive nor exclusive;
some "art" is a form of "cultural property," and some is not. Id.
6. See Hawkins et al., supra note 2, at 51; McCord, supra note 2, at 1008; Bibas, supra
note 2, at 2439. The idea of imposing some sort of duty on the true owner to register stolen
works was discussed initially in O'Keefe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 494 (N.J. 1980).
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registry: art that was stolen prior to the registry's, creation,7 and those
objects (especially archaeological artifacts)' that are not susceptible to ef-
fective registration. In order to deal with the significant twin problems of
prospective retroactivity9 and non-registrability that will arise if an art
theft registry becomes a required element of art replevin actions, 0 courts
should apply a "strict" discovery rule to these objects that fall outside the
registry's scope." This suggestion, while narrow in scope, will not only
help to resolve some of the dilemmas faced by courts, museums, and in-
dividuals, but will provide certainty in the law as well.
This Note acknowledges the desirability of imposing an art theft
registry requirement to clearly delineate what steps future art theft victims
will have to take in order to toll the statute of limitations. Future victims
of art theft would be required to register the stolen object with an art theft
7. One example is the art looted by the Nazis during World War II, which has only re-
cently come to light. See Lipman, supra note 3, at A9 (noting that "thousands of pieces of art-
work looted by the Nazis during the Holocaust reside in museums and private collections around
the world."). The question of the ownership of this art is becoming a troubling issue for the art
world. See David Goldstein, Heirs Try to Reclaim Art Stolen by Nazis, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Sept. 5, 1997, at A2 ("More and more famous artworks are embarrassingly turning up in
prominent museums and private collections. Works by Picasso, Degas and Monet recently have
become the source of tension between their current owners and the heirs of Jewish collectors,
many of whom perished in the Holocaust."); see also discussion infra Part I.
8. This suggestion of course concerns archaeological artifacts that are legitimately in the
possession of the true owner to begin with, not artifacts whose possession or importation into the
United States is in violation of the applicable laws, such as the Archaeological Resources Pro-
tection Act, 16 U.S.C.S. § 470 ee (West Supp. 1997). The discussion of the applicability of the
statute of limitations to archaeological artifacts is not an attempt to enter into the debate of the
propriety of the commercialization of archaeological artifacts. See John H. Merryman, The An-
tiquities Problem, PUB. ARCHAEOLOGY REv., Dec., 1995, at 10-11 (discussing the often con-
flicting views of archaeologists on one side and antiquities collectors and museums on the other).
9. See Hawkins et al., supra note 2, at 94 (stating that there would be "decades of stolen
art (and tens of thousands of valuable objects) outside the scope" of proposed legislation).
10. The current practice in the art world, at least for major galleries and museums, is to
check the Art Loss Register. See infra note 153 and accompanying text. However, this practice
is of uncertain value when the art was stolen in the past. For example, although the New York
Metropolitan Museum of Art checked the Art Loss Register prior to acquiring a Monet, the
ownership of the painting was subsequently challenged by a German citizen who claimed that the
painting was taken from a bank vault in Berlin in 1945. See Jacqueline Trescott, Project Seeks
to Track Works Seized by Nazis, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1997, at D7. Recent court opinions are
beginning to discuss the parties' use of theft registry databases, particularly the Art Loss Regis-
ter. See Erisoty v. Rizik, 1995 WL 91406 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995) (noting that an art theft
victim reported her stolen paintings to the Art Loss Register and discussing the role of the Reg-
ister in helping the FBI locate the paintings).
11. I use the term "strict" to denote a discovery rule where time does not begin to accrue
until the owner becomes aware of the identity of the possessor of the stolen art, regardless of the
owner's "diligence" in looking for the art. This idea is exemplified in Naftziger v. American
Numismatic Society, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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registry such as the Art Loss Register1 2 in order to toll the statute of limi-
tations until they become aware of the identity of the current possessor of
the object. 3 However, this registration requirement cannot equitably be
applied to art stolen in the past or to certain objects. 4 Victims of past art
theft, or those who have non-registrable objects stolen, would still be at
the mercy of a variety of common law solutions such as the nebulous due
diligence inquiry, which have produced a variety of conflicting results,
but no clear-cut guidelines for victims of art theft 5 or purchasers of art
16
to follow. Thus, victims of past thefts and of thefts of non-registrable
objects will have the statute of limitations tolled until they become aware
of the identity of the current possessor of the object, regardless of
whether or not they satisfy a court's subjective due diligence analysis.
Requiring courts to apply a strict discovery rule will benefit art theft vic-
tims, will help reduce the trade in stolen artwork, 17 and will provide for
uniform judicial decisions in art replevin actions.
In the recent case of Naftziger v. American Numismatic Society, 8 a
California Court of Appeal was faced with such a situation. California
12. This proposal is discussed in Bibas, supra note 2; see also discussion infra Part II.B.2.
13. Placing an affirmative duty to register stolen artwork on the victims of art theft in or-
der to preserve their rights is not inequitable in the context of the art world. The most common
art theft scenario that reaches the courts is how to decide between two innocent parties: the true
owner and the bona fide purchaser. Typically, an artwork has been stolen from its true owner,
passed through several hands, and bought, often from a reputable gallery or auction house, by a
collector in good faith. See, e.g., Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 809 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1966), modified on other grounds, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967), modification
rev'd, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969) (discussing a situation in which a bona fide purchaser
bought a Chagall painting from a New York gallery in 1955 which had originally been stolen by
the Nazis in 1941). The theft victim is in the best and most cost-effective position to alert pro-
spective purchasers that the work is stolen. Prospective purchasers would thus have a very
strong incentive to check the theft registry, thereby reducing the market for stolen art. See Bi-
bas, supra note 2, at 2463-64.
14. See discussion infra Part III.A.
15. See discussion infra Part II.A.2-3.
16. One Washington, D.C. company, Trans-Art, will actually issue a "due diligence" cer-
tificate to prospective purchasers of art, purporting to establish that "a genuine effort" was made
to determine if an artwork has been stolen. See Mimi Thompson, The Art Black Book, TOWN &
COUNTRY MONTHLY, May 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9303287. The legal significance of
this service apparently remains untested.
17. Prospective purchasers would thus have extra incentive to check the provenience of
artwork if they know that they would be perpetually vulnerable to replevin actions. This in turn
will have a negative effect on the illicit trade in stolen art by making it harder for thieves to dis-
pose of their wares. Similarly, it would prevent declaratory actions by bona fide purchasers of
stolen artworks who claim that the true owner did not act with reasonable diligence in searching
for the artwork. See infra note 204.
18. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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had enacted a statute of limitations designed to aid victims of art theft. 9
However, the coins at issue in Naftziger had been stolen from a museum
prior to the enactment of the statute.' The Naftziger court reached the
apparently unremarkable decision that under the prior version of the stat-
ute of limitations21 there was an implied discovery rule which meant that
time began to accrue when the owner of stolen coins became aware of the
identity of their current possessor, regardless of his diligence in looking
for the coins.' The decision in Naftziger is significant and relevant to this
Note for two reasons. First, it is an example of a court reaching the cor-
rect result by available methods when confronted with the theft of artifacts
from a museum. Second, and perhaps more important, the decision il-
lustrates the proper response to the national problems inherent in art and
artifact replevin actions: it provides a specific retroactive discovery rule
for art and artifacts stolen prior to the enactment of legislation designed to
aid victims of art theft.'
Part I of this Note discusses the problems of art and artifact theft and
the dilemmas faced by both original owners of stolen artworks and by
subsequent good faith purchasers. Part II discusses the courts' applica-
tions of common law stolen property doctrines to the question of when the
statute of limitations begins to run for stolen art and surveys some of the
academic solutions to art theft, including art theft registries. Part III
demonstrates that in order to give courts clear guidelines and provide
certainty to a confused area of law, a retroactive discovery rule for art
stolen prior to the imposition of a registration requirement should be ap-
plied to toll the statute of limitations.
19. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c) (West Supp. 1996). The current version of the stat-
ute states:
The cause of action in the case of theft ... of any article of historical, interpretive, sci-
entific, or artistic significance is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the
whereabouts of the article by the aggrieved party, his or her agent, or the law enforce-
ment agency which originally investigated the theft.
Id. See also discussion infra Part II.A.3.b.
20. See Nafiziger, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 784.
21. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(3) (West 1982). The prior version of the statute pro-
vided that the cause of action accrued "[w]ithin three years... for taking, detaining, or injuring
any goods or chattels, including actions for the specific recovery of personal property." Id.
22. See Naftziger, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 786 (concluding that "under the prior version of the
statute, the cause of action accrued when the owner discovered the identity of the person in pos-
session of the stolen property, without regard to the owner's diligence or lack thereof in ferret-
ing out that information").
23. Id.
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I. The Cause of the Problem: Art Theft
Art and artifact theft from individuals, museums and archaeological
sites in the past few decades has increased dramatically, creating a situa-
tion where collectors often unknowingly buy stolen goods in good faith. 24
Between 1972 and 1990 the value of the illegal trade in art and antiquities
rose from an estimated $1 billion to $2 billion.' This is attributable to a
number of factors, the greatest of which is the law of supply and de-
mand.26 Not surprisingly, as the demand for art objects as a commodity
rose in the 1980s, so did art theft. 27 Art theft has been around as long as
there has been art to be stolen; the archaeological record is replete with
incidents of robbed graves and plundered tombs.28 Following closely on
the heels of tomb robbing was legislation designed to prevent it.29 Even
the Romans felt the need to pass laws protecting art from theft.30 Recov-
ery by authorities is low, estimated to be between two to thirteen percent
of all art stolen.3 While art theft ranks second behind drug trafficking as
the most lucrative form of illegal trade,32 it receives low priority by most
countries' law enforcement agencies.33 Complicating the problem of art
theft itself is the fact that the theft is sometimes initially undetected34 or
24. See, e.g., Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y.
1991) (noting that defendant's husband purchased painting from a "reputable Manhattan gallery"
without knowing it was stolen).
25. See McCord, supra note 2, at 986 (citing Judith Church, Note, Evaluating the Effec-
tiveness of Foreign Laws on National Ownership of Cultural Property in U.S. Courts, 30
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 179, 180 (1992)). The Times of London estimates that £1 billion
worth of paintings are stolen each year. See Caroline Merrell, Fine Art 'Connoisseurs' Pay
Pounds lbn Visit to English Country Houses, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 3, 1996 (Weekend
Money), available in 1996 WL 6510920.
26. See KARL E. MAYER, THE PLUNDERED PAST: THE STORY OF THE ILLEGAL
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN WORKS OF ART 5-6 (1973).
27. See WORLD PRESS REV.,THE FRENZIED ART MARKET 48 (1989).
28. See, e.g, DORA J. HAMBLIN, POTS AND ROBBERS 73-87 (1970). Hamblin notes that
the modem-day Italian tombaroli's (grave robber's) efforts are often thwarted by the ancient
Etruscans themselves, who often looted tombs soon after burial. Id.
29. See LYNDEL V. PROTT & P.J. O'KEEFE, 1 LAW AND CULTURAL HERITAGE 80-81
(1984) (noting that early laws dealt with tomb robbing).
30. See HAMBLIN, supra note 28, at 73-87 (discussing laws passed during the reigns of
Vespasian in the first century A.D. and Constantine in the fourth century protecting buildings
and statues from looting and dismantling).
31. See Melvin E. De Graw, Art Theft in Perspective, 31 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY &
COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4 (1987).
32. See Grover, supra note 2, at 1435.
33. Only Los Angeles has a full time police detective who specializes strictly in art theft;
the New York Police Department has a detective who investigates art theft along with other
types of crimes. See Miles Corwin, Metro Desk, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1996 at Al. See also
Grover, supra note 2, at 1439 (noting that London has only "two investigative officers and one
computer operator" and that few museums or dealers have liaisons with the police).
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unreported by the owner.' Owners often fail to report thefts because
they fear that they will either endanger their collections by exposing their
vulnerabilities to further theft 6 or eliminate the thief's market, thereby
forcing the art underground37 and reducing the chances for recovery. Ad-
ditionally, owners may wish to avoid taxes which would be imposed on
them if the government learned of their collections and the art was subse-
quently recovered.38
The dilemma that the rise in art theft exacerbates is how to decide
ownership between two innocent parties. There are tens of thousands of
stolen artworks, worth billions of dollars, not yet recovered by their true
owners. 39  The nature of art objects and the realities of the art market
contribute to this problem.4' Courts often have to decide claims to re-
cover stolen art, brought against innocent purchasers long after the initial
theft.4 Because the art market is saturated with stolen objects,42 this
situation will persist. The mere passage of time will not make the prob-
lem go away.43 Thus, there exists the very real problem of deciding own-
ership for a vast number of objects that were stolen in the past.
34. See, e.g., Naftziger v. American Numismatic Soc'y, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 787 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996) (noting Oat museum did not discover theft of coins for over 30 years).
35. See, e.g., Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 153 A.D.2d 143, 145 (App.
Div. 1990) (noting that no report of the theft of Marc Chagall's painting "The Cattle Dealer"
was made to "the police, F.B.I., Interpol [or] the Art Dealer's Association").
36. See Grover, supra note 2, at 1436 (citing Robert A. Jones, BYU Puzzle: Case of the
Missing Art, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1989, at 1).
37. See Guggenheim, 153 A.D.2d at 145-46 (the lower court reported that plaintiff be-
lieved, as was not uncommon in the 1960s and 1970s, that publicizing theft would hinder a sto-
len painting's recovery by "driving it further underground").
38. See Grover, supra note 2, at 1437 (citing Judd Tully, Hot Art, Cold Cash, J. ART,
Nov. 1990, at 1).
39. See Hawkins et al., supra note 2, at 94.
40. See id. at 50 (stating that "unlike most forms of personal property, art is frequently
nonperishable ... easily transportable (the art trade, legitimate and otherwise, is notable for its
internationalism) and hence, easily concealed; readily identified, nonfungible; and often of dra-
matically increasing value"). The problems of art theft are often compounded by those who
trade in art. "'The hear-no-evil, see-no-evil dilemma is really at the heart of" the trade in sto-
len art, according to one gallery owner. See David Goldstein, Heirs Try to Reclaim Art Stolen
by Nazis, SAN DMGO UNION-TRM., Sept. 5, 1997, at A2 (discussing the restitution of art to
holocaust victims and their heirs). Critics focus on the failure of "curators, collectors and mu-
seum directors to investigate the origins of art." Julie Hirschfeld, Project Seeks Looted Art-
works, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 5, 1997, at 34A.
41. See, e.g., Kunstammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1161 (2d Cir.
1982) discussed infra Part II.A.2. See also Hawkins et al., supra note 2, at 49 (noting that art
replevin actions are often brought long after the initial theft).
42. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
43. For example, the art world is just starting to come to terms with thefts that took place
in Europe over 50 years ago. See Trescott, supra note 10 (discussing the Holocaust Art Resto-
ration Project's plans to deal with art stolen during World War 11).
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The scenario involving the original owner and the subsequent good
faith purchaser of an artwork is undoubtedly familiar to those working in
museums and art galleries, as well as to students of property law.' A
painting, one of a series, is stolen from an artist. Some time later, she
learns of its whereabouts. Whether or not she tried very hard to get it
back before it surfaced is open to dispute. In the meantime, the painting
changed hands several times and is now possessed by a man who bought
it in good faith. The artist wants it back, and sues in replevin." Is her
claim barred by the statute of limitations?46 This situation has met with a
myriad of academic suggestions and judicial solutions, which are dis-
cussed in Part II of this Note. Now add a new wrinkle to the above sce-
nario. Between the theft and the artist's suit, a statute was enacted to aid
victims of art theft. Under this statute, all the theft victim has to do to toll
the statute of limitations indefinitely is to register her stolen work with an
existing art theft database. However, she has not notified the registry that
the work has been stolen.47 Should the artist be able to recover the paint-
ing? This question is answered in Part III of this Note.
II. Responses to the Problem
A. Common Law Solutions
Legal responses to art theft have been characterized as being "mired
in horse and buggy law" and thus unsuited to the problems inherent in
stolen art actions.48 Judicial responses to the problems of stolen art have
been more of a Band-Aid than a cure: since courts have applied varying
standards and rules, no clear-cut guidelines have emerged. Perhaps the
biggest dilemma has arisen through the varying requirements of "due dili-
44. See JESSE DUKEMINER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 117-29 (2d ed. 1988) (discuss-
ing O'Keefe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980), and the adverse possession of chattels). See
also John Henry Merryman, Title Problems in the Art World, ALI-ABA COURSE STUDY, Jan.
16, 1997 (discussing a hypothetical in which a dealer buys a Morandi painting at Christie's in
1990 and sells it to a collector, who receives a letter six years later from a lawyer in Milan,
stating that the painting was stolen from an Italian private collection, and demanding its return).
45. For a somewhat more anomalous set of facts, where the plaintiffs were the "bona fide
purchasers" and the defendants the "true owners," see Erisoty v. Rizik, 1995 WL 91406 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 23, 1995). See discussion infra note 204.
46. For an inconclusive answer to this question, see O'Keefe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862
(N.J. 1980).
47. Perhaps, since the theft occurred some time before the creation of the database, she did
not know of the legislation; or perhaps she had no photographic documentation of the piece; or
the work, part of a series, was not so unique that a written description would accurately identify
the painting. See infra note 185.
48. Hawkins et al., supra note 2, at 50.
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gence" on the part of the owner of stolen art. Courts have alternatively
required due diligence and specifically disavowed it.49 The requirement
of due diligence has been applied whether the courts characterize their
theory of accrual as a "demand and refusal rule" or a discovery rule.50
This lack of clear-cut directives leaves a theft victim uncertain as to what
to do to toll the statute of limitations. Similarly, bona fide purchasers do
not know what they must do in order to assure clear title when purchasing
artwork.
51
This section briefly outlines the judicial responses to stolen art-ad-
verse possession, the demand and refusal rule, and the discovery rule-
and discusses the approaches courts have taken to the "due diligence" in-
quiry. Although this section specifically focuses on New York and Cali-
fornia cases since New York City and Los Angeles are centers of the
world art market, the problem of art theft exists nationwide.52 This sec-
tion illustrates, among other things, the confused approaches taken by the
courts, both between and within jurisdictions. Courts in different juris-
dictions utilize different theories to determine when the statute of limita-
tions begins to run,53 and courts within the same jurisdictions often dis-
agree on this issue, even when ostensibly applying the same theory of
accrual. 54
(1) Adverse Possession
The concept of adverse possession of chattels is derived from real
property principals. The traditional elements of adverse possession are
that the property be held in an adverse, hostile, open, notorious, visible,
exclusive, and continuous manner for the statutorily prescribed time in
order to bar the original owner's replevin action.55 If these elements are
satisfied, the property is then owned by the adverse possessor. Adverse
possession thus defeats the common law rule that a thief cannot pass valid
49. See discussion infra Part II.A.2-3.
50. Id.
51. As Professor Merryman notes: "If dealer asks how he can minimize the risk of ac-
quiring stolen works, how do you advise him? 1. Buy carefully. Check provenience. (Explain
why this is useless advice)." Merryman, supra note 44.
52. See, e.g., O'Keefe, 416 A.2d at 862 (litigated in New Jersey); Autocephalous Greek-
Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 27& (7th Cir.
1990) (litigated in federal court in Indiana).
53. For example, California and New Jersey courts have applied a discovery rule, as has
the Seventh Circuit in interpreting Illinois law, while the Second Circuit, interpreting New York
law, has applied a demand and refusal rule. See discussion infra Part lI.A.2-3.
54. For example, California courts disagree on the importance of the plaintiffs diligence in
searching for the stolen art. See discussion infra Part H.A.3.b.
55. See Gerstenblith, supra note 2, at 120.
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title to an object.5 6 The traditional concept of adverse possession focused
on the actions of the adverse possessor of the property, rather than the
true owner. 7 The original owner's relative diligence in searching for the
object and his or her ability to bring suit are irrelevant to the application
of the doctrine. 8
While adverse possession may work well with certain types of chat-
tels, it is an unsatisfactory response to art theft, at least from the point of
view of the original owner, given the easily concealable nature of art and
artifacts. Unlike domestic animals, to which much of the early adverse
possession cases apply, art is seldom open to view by the general public
in the way that horses and cows are.59 Modem formulations of adverse
possession seek to alleviate the harsh results of the doctrine using two
primary methods: the demand and refusal rule and the discovery rule. 6°
(2) The Demand and Refusal Rule and Due Diligence
The demand and refusal rule has been used in art and artifacts cases,
primarily in New York, to toll the statute of limitations until the owner
makes a demand, and the possessor refuses, to return the artwork.6' In
Menzel v. List, for example, a Marc Chagall painting, "Le Paysan A
L'echelle," was stolen from Mr. and Mrs. Menzel by the Nazis in 1941.
62 In 1955, List, admittedly a bona fide purchaser, bought the painting
from a gallery in New York.63 In 1962, Mrs. Menzel discovered that List
had the painting and demanded its return.' List refused, asserting that
the statute of limitations had begun to run from either the time the paint-
ing was stolen in 1941, or from the time he purchased the painting in
1955.65 In rejecting this defense, the court stated that in "replevin, as
56. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 2442.
57. Modern formulations of adverse possession have changed this inquiry. See discussion
infra Part II.A.2.
58. See Gerstenblith, supra note 2, at 131.
59. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 2442 (noting that "[tihe majority of reported cases on ad-
verse possession of chattels between 1870 and 1930 involved horses, cattle, sheep, and mules"
and that case law crafted to fit stolen animals did not work as well when used to cover more
easily concealed objects).
60. The discovery rule is similar, if not equivalent, to laches. See Bibas, supra note 2, at
2448.
61. See Kunstanunlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1161 (2d Cir. 1982);
Republic of Turk. v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2823 (1988);
Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 809 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified on other grounds, 279
N.Y.S.2d 608 (App. Div. 1967), modification rev'd, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969).
62. See Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
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well as conversion, the cause of action against a person who lawfully
comes by a chattel arises, not upon the stealing or the taking, but upon the
defendant's refusal to convey the chattel."'
Following Menzel, the Second Circuit in Kunstammlungen zu Weimar
v. Elicofon stated that a museum's claim for return of two stolen Albrecht
Duerer portraits accrued when the museum demanded their return from
the bona fide purchaser. 67 In Elicofon, the two Duerer portraits, circa
1499, were stolen in 1945 from a castle in Germany' where they were
being stored.' Elicofon bought the pair for $450 from an ex-serviceman
in 1946, and displayed them in his home, unaware that they were stolen,
until 1966, when the museum demanded their return.7' The Second Cir-
cuit rejected Elicofon's arguments that the museum's claim was time
barred, and held that the museum's cause of action began to accrue when
Elicofon refused to comply with the demand for the paintings' return.71
Both Menzel and Elicofon indicated that the "demand and refusal
rule" does not require an analysis of the relative due diligence of the
owner seeking to recover his or her property.72 However, five years
later, the Second Circuit, again interpreting New York law, held in
DeWeerth v. Baldinger that the demand and refusal rule requires an
owner to exercise reasonable diligence in locating her property. 73
DeWeerth I stated that an owner has a "duty of reasonable diligence in
attempting to locate stolen property" in addition to making a demand for
its return within a reasonable time.74 The facts in DeWeerth I are similar
to both Elicofon and Menzel. A Monet was stolen in 1945 from a castle
in Germany and was acquired in 1957 by Baldinger, a bona fide pur-
chaser.7' In 1982, DeWeerth discovered the painting's whereabouts and
demanded its return.76 The court found that DeWeerth had failed to make
a showing of reasonable diligence, and thug had failed to prove superior
66. Id. at 809.
67. See 678 F.2d 1150, 1161 (2d Cir. 1982).
68. In 1982, the time of the opinion, the castle was located in what was then East Ger-
many.
69. See Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1161.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. In Elicofon, the court indicated that the plaintiffs had been diligent; however, the court
did not indicate what effect, if any, the plaintiffs' diligence had on the tolling of the statute of
limitations. See id. In Menzel, the court made no mention of the plaintiff's diligence. See
Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
73. See DeWeerth, 836 F.2d 103, 108-10 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2823
(1988) (hereinafter DeWeerth 1).
74. Id. at 108.
75. See id. at 105.
76. See id. at 106.
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title.77 In a subsequent action,7" DeWeerth moved to recall the mandate in
light of Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell,79 which held that
the New York statute of limitations did not require a showing of reason-
able diligence. The Second Circuit denied the motion, noting that
"[t]here is nothing in Erie that suggests that consistency must be achieved
at the expense of finality."' 0 To what extent DeWeerth I will be followed
is unclear, however. For example, in Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan
Museum of Art, decided after Guggenheim and DeWeerth I, the district
court found that Guggenheim was controlling.8 ' There, Turkey sought to
recover artifacts from the Metropolitan Museum of Art which were ille-
gally imported to the United States in 1966.82 Referring to the DeWeerth
I holding as "creative," the district court did not require a showing of due
diligence. 3
The demand and refusal rule is susceptible to criticism on a number
of grounds. It benefits both the art thief and the true owner and is detri-
mental to the bona fide purchaser. The rule is beneficial to art thieves,
since the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the demand is
made. Once the demand is made, if the thief can postpone returning the
object long enough, the owner's replevin action will be barred. Similarly,
a true owner can postpone suit indefinitely, effectively "eviscerating" the
statute of limitations, and thereby making the bona fide purchaser per-
petually vulnerable to lawsuits. 4 Since the demand and refusal rule shifts
the focus of scrutiny from the possessor to the true owner, the bona fide
purchaser cannot determine whether his property is safe from attack, nor
can artwork be conveyed with certainty. 5 Consequently, the demand and
refusal rule prevents repose of stolen artwork, regardless of the actions of
the bona fide purchaser.
(3) The Discovery Rule
The discovery rule, like the demand and refusal rule, shifts the in-
quiry from the conduct of the possessor to that of the true owner. The
discovery rule originated in medical malpractice cases, rather than com-
77. See id. at 104.
78. See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir. 1994) (hereinafter DeWeerth 11).
79. 569 N.E.2d 426, 431 (N.Y. 1991).
80. DeWeerth 1, 38 F.3d at 1274.
81. Republic of Turk. v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44, 46-47 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
82. See id. at 45.
83. Id. at 45.
84. Bibas, supra note 2, at 2445-46.
85. See Gerstenblith, supra note 2, at 140.
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mon law property doctrines. 6 Conceptually, the discovery rule is simple:
the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers
that he or she has a cause of action. 7 The dilemma that courts face in art
replevin cases is if and how the true owner's action or inaction in search-
ing for the art effects the running of the limitations period-the due dili-
gence inquiry.
a. Applying Due Diligence
Under the discovery rule enunciated in the seminal case of O'Keefe
v. Snyder, the cause of action does not begin to accrue until the true
owner "first knew, or reasonably should have known through the exercise
of due diligence, of the cause of action, including the identity of the pos-
sessor."8 8 In O'Keefe, Georgia O'Keefe sued Snyder, the possessor of
three of her paintings, in replevin.89 O'Keefe alleged that the paintings
had been stolen in 1946. 90 Thirty years later, she learned of their where-
abouts and demanded their return from Snyder.91 The New Jersey Su-
preme Court rejected the lower court's application of the adverse posses-
sion doctrine, finding adverse possession unsuitable to art objects. The
court instead adopted the discovery rule, consciously shifting the inquiry
to the conduct of the true owner, stating that the "focus of the inquiry will
no longer be whether the possessor has met the tests of adverse posses-
sion, but whether the owner has acted with due diligence in pursuing his
or her personal property." 93 O'Keefe indicated that determining what
constitutes "due diligence" is a fact specific analysis which will vary de-
pending on the facts of each case, including the "nature and value of the
property."'
The O'Keefe approach was followed by the Seventh Circuit in Auto-
cephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman
Fine Arts, Inc..' In Autocephalous, a sixth century mosaic was removed
86. See, e.g., Fernandi v. Strully, 173 A.2d 277 (N.J. 1961) (where plaintiff did not dis-
cover that a surgeon failed to remove an object from her abdomen for three years after the sur-
gery, the court held that statute should not begin to run until plaintiff knew or had reason to
know of the presence of the object).
87. See id.
88. O'Keefe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 870 (N.J. 1980).
89. See id. at 864.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 866.
92. See id. at 872.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 873. The question remains whether the late Melina Mercouri's efforts to retrieve
the Elgin marbles from Great Britain would satisfy the "due diligence" requirements of
O'Keefe. See Merryman, supra note 51 at 1883 (discussing the late Greek Minister of Culture's
official impassioned requests for the marbles' return).
95. 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
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from a church in Northern Cyprus sometime prior to 1979, and was later
sold to Goldberg for over $1 million in the Geneva airport.' When
Goldberg tried to resell the mosaic, Cyprus requested its return. 97 In bal-
ancing the equities of the case, the Seventh Circuit devoted considerable
attention to the somewhat clandestine nature of the sale. 98 The court
noted that in such cases, where the circumstances surrounding the art are
suspicious, "dealers can (and probably should)" undertake a full back-
ground check of the item.' The court found that while Cyprus might not
have contacted all possible organizations in its search for the mosaic, Cy-
prus' actions were "sweeping and consistent with trade practices" and
thus satisfied the due diligence requirement of the discovery rule." In-
terestingly, the Autocephalous court focused its inquiry on the actions of
both the true owner and the purchaser,"'1 while the O'Keefe court was ap-
parently concerned solely with the owner's actions.
b. Questioning Due Diligence: California's Conflicting Approach
O'Keefe is often seen as the embodiment of the discovery rule, re-
quiring due diligence on the part of the true owner. However, two recent
California decisions interpreting the statute of limitations, Naftziger v.
American Numismatic Society1  and Society of California Pioneers v.
Baker, 1 3 have facilitated the recovery of stolen art by the true owner.
While both of these cases were decided in the owner's favor, they differ
in their approach to the due diligence element of the discovery rule."4
In 1983, California amended its statute of limitations for stolen
objects."°5 The current version of the California Civil Procedure Code,
section 338, subdivision (c) °6 provides that:
[The cause of action in case of theft... of any article of historical,
interpretive, scientific, or artistic significance is not deemed to have ac-
crued until the discovery of the whereabouts of the article by the ag-
96. See id. at 281-82.
97. See id. at 283.
98. See id. at 281-84.
99. Id. at 294. The usefulness of this suggestion is debatable. See Merryman, supra note
51.
100. See Autocephalous, 917 F.2d at 290.
101. Using the term "bona fide purchaser" here may be inappropriate, given the court's
seemingly dubious view of Goldberg's actions.
102. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
103. 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
104. Professor Merryman indicates the different approaches of the O'Keefe, Baker, and
Naftziger decisions to the due diligence inquiry. See Merryman, supra note 51.
105. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(3) (Deering's 1983).
106. Prior to 1988, subdivision (c) was designated as subdivision (3). The 1989 amendment
to subdivision (c) substituted the words "article of historical, interpretive, scientific, or artistic
significance" for "art or artifact." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c) (West Supp. 1997).
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grieved party, his or her agentf or the law enforcement agency which
originally investigated the theft.
In Nafiziger, the court held that under the applicable prior version of
the statute of limitations, l s the cause of action for replevin accrued when
the owner discovered the identity of the current possessor, without regard
to the owner's relative diligence in "ferreting out" the objects' where-
abouts.'09 The pre-1983 version of section 338 did not answer the ques-
tion of when the cause of action accrues.1 In Naftziger, a New York
numismatic museum operated by the American Numismatic Society had
been given 1,542 copper cents, minted between 1793 and 1857.' Some-
time prior to 1970, a thief substituted 129 superficially identical but infe-
rior coins."' The theft was not discovered until 1990." After learning
of the theft, the museum discovered that Naftziger, apparently a bona fide
purchaser, was in possession of some of the authentic coins.114 Naftziger
refused the museum's demand for the coins.115 The lower court granted
summary judgment for Naftziger's quiet title action based on an adverse
possession theory, refusing to borrow New York's demand rule.11 6 At is-
sue on appeal was whether, under the pre-1983 version of section 338(c),
the cause of action accrues when the theft occurs, or when the owner dis-
covers the theft, the identity of the thief, or the whereabouts of the cur-
rent possessor of the property. 7 The court apparently declined to apply
the discovery rule of the amended statute retroactively. Instead, the court
held that the pre-1983 statute contained an implied discovery rule, so that
the cause of action accrued when the museum discovered the identity of
the possessor of the coins.'
In Society of California Pioneers v. Baker,119 the court held that the
amended version of the statute of limitations applied where the pre-1983
version had not run in the defendant's favor at the time the statute was
amended.' 0  Both the Baker and Naftziger courts declined to decide
107. Id. This amendment was apparently a reaction to the New Jersey decision in O'Keefe.
108. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(3) (West 1982).
109. See Nafiziger, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 786.
110. Section 338(3) provided that the cause of action accrued "within three years... for
taking, detaining, or injuring any goods or chattels, including actions for the specific recovery of
personal property." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(3) (West 1982).
111. See Naftziger, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787.
112. Seeid.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 788.
115. See id. at 787.
116. See id. at 792.
117. See id. at 786.
118. See id. at 788.
119. 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 874.
120. See id.
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whether the amended statute should be applied retroactively.121 However,
the Baker court, disagreeing with the Naftziger court, noted that "the
question of reasonable diligence has some bearing" on the statute of limi-
tations issue." In Baker, a gold and quartz cane handle was stolen from
the Society of California Pioneers in 1978.1 In 1980, Kah, a bona fide
donee, received the handle as a gift from his mother. 24 Kah sold the
handle to Baker in 1991. '5 The court concluded that under California
law, the statute of limitations begins to run anew when the current posses-
sor acquires an item.'26 Thus, the Society's action was timely since the
statute was amended before the limitations period expired against Kah. 27
The court, citing Guggenheim, concluded that the plaintiffs could not have
been charged with actual or constructive notice of the whereabouts of the
cane handle.128 Thus, Baker is at odds with Naftziger, since Baker implies
that the owner's due diligence is a factor to be considered in applying the
discovery rule.
The discovery rule, like the demand and refusal rule, is subject to
criticism on the grounds that it "renders the statute of limitations virtually
meaningless" and harms those who attempt to deal honestly with personal
property.' 29 In addition, since the discovery rule abandons any require-
ments for the possessor's use of the object, 3° the possessor has no incen-
tive to reveal possession of the property.' Perhaps most significant,
however, is the idea that the due diligence requirement of the discovery
rule can gut the common law axiom that a thief cannot pass valid title.
Under this due diligence requirement, a bona fide purchaser can acquire
valid title to stolen art. 32 This is of course the inevitable effect when the
statute of limitations runs; however, requiring a showing of due diligence
increases this possibility.
B. Academic Proposals
Like common law responses to art theft, numerous academic solu-
tions have been offered as well.' Academic solutions to the problems of
121. See id. at 871.
122. Id. at 870 n.10.
123. See id. at 866.
124. See id. at 867.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 869-871 (citing Harpending v. Meyer, 55 Cal. 555 (1880)).
127. See id. at 871.
128. See id. at 873.
129. Gerstenblith, supra note 2, at 145.
130. For example, there is no requirement that the property be held "open and notoriously."
131. See Hayworth, supra note 2, at 358.
132. See id. at 383.
133. See authorities cited supra note 2.
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art theft can be broadly classified into two categories. First, there are
proposals which suggest utilizing or modifying one of the common law
doctrines, either to more effectively deal with art theft as a whole, or to
more effectively balance the equities between owners and bona fide pur-
chasers.' Second, there are proposals, which advocate the affirmative
duty of one or both of the parties to utilize art registry systems or com-
puterized databases to record title or report theft. 35 Broadly speaking,
this latter category is in a sense an attempt to delineate a specific due dili-
gence requirement. Solutions that advocate the affirmative duty of future
theft victims to register their stolen artworks with an international data-
base are preferable to attempts to reform existing common law doctrines.
A registration requirement would help stem the transfer of. stolen art by
imposing an affirmative duty on both owners of stolen artworks and pro-
spective artwork purchasers in order to preserve their rights.' 36 However,
database legislation is not the best way to deal with art that was stolen in
the past.3 7
(1) Solutions Utilizing Common Law Doctrines
Various proposals have focused on utilizing existing property doc-
trines to deal with the problems of stolen art. Discussing personal prop-
erty generally, one author advocates utilizing a model of the adverse pos-
session doctrine which substitutes a good faith/bad faith standard for
notice and other types of qualifying conduct."3 Another proposal advo-
cates adopting the demand rule of Guggenheim, noting that "art collectors
are well-advised to 'buy the piece, never the story.'" A third proposal
states that "[floreign nations should not be able to recover art and antiq-
uities from United States purchasers merely because the removal of such
works violated export laws in the foreign nation."""4 This third proposal,
recognizing that New York is a major art market, suggests harmonizing
New York law with the law of other states by merely requiring a showing
of reasonable diligence by owners of stolen artwork and antiquities. 4 '
This requirement, the author asserts, will provide incentives both for
134. See Foutty, supra note 2, at 1860-61; Gerstenblith, supra note 2, at 160-63; Montagu,
supra note 2, at 100; Hayworth, supra note 2, at 383; Webb, supra note 2, at 896-99.
135. See generally Hawkins et al., supra note 2, at 50; Bibas, supra note 2, at 2439; Mar-
gules, supra note 2, at 646; McCord, supra note 2, at 1008.
136. Advocating a particular database registration proposal is outside the scope of the Note.
Rather, the point of the Note is that whatever legislation is enacted, a discovery rule should be
applied to thefts that took place prior to the enactment of the legislation.
137. See discussion infra Part ELI.A-B.
138. See Gerstenblith, supra note 2, at 160-63.
139. Hayworth, supra note 2, at 383 (citation omitted).
140. Montagu, supra note 2, at 100.
141. See id. at 101.
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owners to publicize the loss of stolen art, and for purchasers to investigate
title to artworks. 142  Thus, the international trade in stolen artworks will
be reduced, and certainty and finality will be brought to art transac-
tions.1 43  Advocating due diligence following Autocephalous, another
author suggests that, since owners of art are "uniquely situated to mount
an effective search," due diligence properly allocates the costs to art own-
ers.'44 Yet another suggestion is to reform the due diligence rule, primar-
ily by courts enunciating clear guidelines as to what constitutes due dili-
gence.145 This proposal places burdens both on the owner to investigate
by the best methods available, and on the purchaser to investigate title via
current art catalogs in order to be considered a bona fide purchaser.1
46
These proposals are all generally susceptible to the same criticisms as
the common law doctrines from which they arise. 147 Perhaps the best way
to deal with the problems inherent in stolen art cases is to leave these
common law doctrines behind where possible, and to take advantage of
current practices in the art world by utilizing an art theft database. As
cogently argued by several authors, 148 the technology needed for such a
database, which would stem the trade in stolen art and better balance the
equities between the victim of art theft and the bona fide purchaser, cur-
rently exists. As discussed below, such a solution would provide a better
alternative than common law doctrines for future cases of art theft, but
not for cases of past theft.
(2) Art Registry and Title Search Solutions
A number of services are available to check title to artwork. For ex-
ample, the Art Loss Register is an international computerized database,
underwritten by a variety of auction houses and insurance companies.'49
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. Foutty, supra note 2, at 1860-61.
145. See Webb, supra note 2, at 896-99.
146. See id.
147. See discussion supra Part II.A.2-3.
148. See generally Hawkins et al., supra note 2; Bibas, supra note 2.
149. The Art Loss Register is the United States subsidiary of a British Corporation, The
International Art and Antiquities Loss Register. Shareholders of the Art Loss Register include
Sotheby's, Christie's, the International Foundation for Art Research, and others. The Art Loss
Register, which has been operating since 1991, has a database of approximately 100,000 items,
including paintings, antiquities, and furniture. The Art Loss Register acquires information from
three primary sources: victims of theft, insurance companies, and the police. In order for an
item to be registered, it must have been reported as stolen to the police, and the item must be
uniquely describable. The Art Loss Register is used primarily in two ways: it provides a means
to screen catalogues of auction houses in order to see if any of the offered items have been re-
ported as stolen (the Register screens 400,000 lots annually), and it offers an "art theft search
service" for private individuals and museums who wish to acquire an artwork. Telephone Inter-
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The Art Loss Register stores descriptions and photographs of stolen art-
works worldwide. 5 ' For a small fee, prospective buyers can search the
register.15' The effectiveness of the Art Loss Register in identifying sto-
len art is undeniable.'52 It is routinely used by museums and galleries to
check title to artwork.
53
There are several proposals calling for legislation which would util-
ize such databases. One suggestion is to target auction houses and muse-
ums. 54  This suggestion in a sense imposes a due diligence requirement
on the "pillars of the market place."'55 This position asserts that both mu-
seums and auction houses must report all transactions involving "suspect
works of art."151 In addition, museums and auction houses should take
responsibility for diligently searching titles of acquired and auctioned
works. 57 To ensure this, liability for warranty of title would be irrevoca-
bly placed on the museums and auction houses.' However, this sugges-
tion is subject to the same criticism as common law doctrines: it produces
no clear-cut rules or guidelines for courts to follow. Additionally,, it fails
to address both the transfer of artwork between individuals and the issue
of retroactivity.
A second suggestion is the creation of an international title system
requiring the registration of all artworks and cultural property, and the re-
view with Anna Kisluk, Director of Operations of the New York Office of The Art Loss Regis-
ter, (Oct. 3, 1997) [hereinafter Kisluk Interview].
150. See id.
151. Currently, there is no charge to report the first stolen item. Subsequent listings are $20
per item. The fee to search the database to see if a particular item is stolen is $50. See id.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Trupin, No. 95 Cr. 450, 1996 WL 50237, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 8, 1996) (discussing IFAR's role in recovering a stolen Chagall painting). The Art Loss
Register, since it began operating in 1991, has been involved in recovering approximately £25
million worth of stolen art since its inception. See generally Kanal Ahmed, Psst... want an
old master? Unscrupulous Dealers are Encouraging a Boom in Theft, THE GUARDIAN (Man-
chester), Nov. 30, 1996, at 5. "The Register has lately been adding about 1,400 pieces of stolen
art and antiques each month, more than triple the 1993 average, and thus far in 1997 identified
nearly $20 million in stolen goods, according to operations manager Caroline Wakeford." Wil-
liam Montalbano, Foreign Desk, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 18, 1997, at Al. According to Ms. Kisluk,
the Art Loss Register has recovered approximately 900 primary objects and 4,000 "associated
objects" since 1991 and is instrumental in recovering an average of "one item per day." See
Kisluk Interview, supra note 149.
153. According to Ronald Tauber, the chairman of the Art Loss Register's New York of-
fice, the registry's database is regularly checked by museums and action houses before they ac-
quire artworks. See Walter V. Robinson, Art Registry Did Not Inform Met of Claim, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 25, 1997, at Al.
154. See McCord, supra note 2, at 1008.
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
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cording of all transactions relating to cultural property.'59 Registering
with the system would satisfy due diligence on the part of the owner, and
failure to record a transaction would create a presumption of a bad faith
transfer."6 This suggestion, while facile in theory, may be impractical in
reality. While the affirmative, prospective duty of museums, galleries
and individuals to register their artworks and antiquities is laudable, actu-
ally getting people and institutions to do so is unlikely. Additionally, the
proposal ignores problems of retroactivity and does not solve the problem
of the failure to register.
A third suggestion is a reaction to the decision in Guggenheim. The
authors of this proposal, which is a comprehensive legislative solution de-
signed to balance the equities between the owner and bona fide pur-
chaser, 61 suggest that a confidential, user financed, computerized inter-
national art loss registry be utilized. 62 In this scenario, accrual of the
statute of limitations would depend upon whether the owner or the bona
fide purchaser utilized the statutory procedures. 163 An owner who "expe-
ditiously" registers the stolen work would have the statute of limitations
tolled indefinitely, so long as he or she "exercised reasonable diligence in
searching for the art.""6 "Correspondingly, a purchaser who checked the
registry at the time of purchase would be protected by a three-year limita-
tions period from the date of purchase.' At the very minimum, this
proposal argues, the New York legislature should overrule Guggenheim
and replace the demand and refusal rule with a discovery rule that incor-
porates due diligence."6 As for the problem of retroactivity, the authors
suggest that owners of art stolen before the enactment of the proposal be
given a "window" of two years to register the stolen art.' 67 This registra-
tion would be applicable only against subsequent possessors. ' The rights
of current possessors would be unaffected by the owner's registration. 69
Furthermore, in this situation, a current or subsequent possessor could
bring suit to quiet title and prevail, even where the owner had registered
the stolen art, on a showing that prior to registration the owner had not
been diligent. 170
159. See Margules, supra note 2, at 646.
160. See id.
161. See Hawkins et al., supra note 2, at 53.
162. See id. at 90-93.
163. See id.
164. Id. at 54.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 96.
167. See id. at 94.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 94.
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This proposal is certainly a laudable solution to the problems of de-
ciding ownership between two innocent parties. However, the authors'
concern for bringing commercial certainty to the New York art market M
may unduly prejudice true owners. Their legislative solution is an attempt
to codify due diligence on the part of the owner, and may not provide a
clear-cut rule that would be easy for individuals and courts to follow.
The solution to the problem of retroactivity favors possessors over true
owners of stolen art. Furthermore, the due diligence requirement beyond
the affirmative duty to register stolen art" subjects the true owner to the
nebulous, retrospective requirements of due diligence, even though he
complied with the "window" in the statute.
Another related proposal,173 based on the idea of an international
computer theft registry, would automatically stay the statute of limitations
for the owner of stolen art. 74 In this scenario, owners who reported the
theft to the database and to police would always win as against a bona fide
purchaser.17 Discussing the problems of thefts that took place before the
enactment of such legislation, this proposal asserts that theft victims who
wish to retain their rights should be required to register their thefts within
one year of enactment. 
176
I. Dealing With Art Stolen in the Past: A Strict
Discovery Rule
It is the premise of this Note that requiring theft victims to register
their stolen artworks with a computerized database would effectively re-
duce the trade in stolen art and would provide certainty in the law for
cases of future art theft. This proposal is forward looking. Its appeal
primarily rests in the incentive that such an affirmative requirement would
give to owners and purchasers to register their artworks. 177 The require-
ment of such a registry would clarify what steps a theft victim must take
to preserve his or her rights, while negating the nebulous due diligence
requirements of recent decisions. However, recent legislative propos-
als179 that require theft victims to register their stolen artworks and/or re-
171. See id. at 51-52.
172. See id. at 94.
173. This proposal predates the Hawkins et al. proposal.
174. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 2439.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 2467.
177. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 2467 (stating that the impetus behind these rules "is to gen-
erate strong incentives to investigate and report thefts").
178. See, e.g., O'Keefe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 862 (N.J. 1980).
179. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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quire prospective purchasers to perform title searches fail to adequately
address the problems of retroactivity and non-registrability.
A. Registration Requirements are Inapplicable to Past Thefts and
Certain Objects
Applying a registry requirement retroactively to artwork stolen in the
past would be unfair for several reasons.o80 First, it would be inequitable
to require past theft victims to register their art within a certain period or
lose their rights. In addition, such registration would serve no purpose
against current possessors or future donees of stolen art, as they would
have no incentive to check the registry. A related problem is that past
victims of theft may have no occasion to learn of the legislation. This is-
sue is less acute for museums and galleries, who stay abreast of current
developments, than it is for individual owners. Thus, past theft victims
may either face the loss of their rights,"' or be disadvantaged in a due
diligence inquiry.' 82 Additionally, even assuming that past theft victims
are aware of a theft registry, they may well lack the photographic or de-
scriptive documentation to take advantage of the registry. Several authors
have proposed a "window" whereby past theft victims would be required
to register their loss within a certain period of time. However, one such
proposal is potentially inequitable, since an owner who fails to register
would be banned from recovery regardless of the reason for doing so, 183
and the other proposal adds a due diligence element into the analysis,
which would not provide clear-cut guidelines.'84
In addition to problems of retroactivity, certain art objects, by their
very nature, are not susceptible to effective registration. This issue has
not been dealt with by those proposing art theft or title registries. Many
objects, both ancient and modern, have distinctive characteristics that can
be recorded by photographic or descriptive means, but some do not."' 5
180. Hawkins et al. notes that for retroactivity, "the easiest approach would be to make the
statute non-retroactive, except to the extent of overruling Guggenheim and retroactively applying
a discovery rule" which would require a showing of due diligence on the part of the owner. See
Hawkins et al., supra note 2, at 94.
181. Under the Bibas proposal, supra note 2, at 2467.
182. Under the Hawkins et al. proposal, supra note 2, at 94.
183. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 2467 ("victims [of past thefts] who wish to retain their
rights to recover should be required to register their thefts with the police and the database
within one year of the enactment of this proposal").
184. See Hawkins et al., supra note 2, at 94 (proposing allowing past theft victims a two-
year "window" to obtain the statute's benefits).
185. According to Ms. Kisluk, in order for an item to be registered with the Art Loss Reg-
ister, the item must be "uniquely describable" either by descriptive or photographic means.
Certain types of items require a photograph, such as antique furniture. The photograph re-
quirement can be substituted by a description if the object, such as a painting, is describable and
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For example, a modem painting"'6 or an early Byzantine mosaic'87 Most
likely possess sufficiently unique characteristics which make their regis-
tration feasible. However, what good would a photographic reproduction
or a written description of a Roman lamp or a modem, albeit rare,
American coin be?188 Such objects, while undeniably valuable, were pro-
duced on a large scale. Many archeological artifacts, especially ceramics
and coins, fall into this category. 8 9 Any photograph 1" or description of
such objects would be equally likely to apply to other objects in the same
class. In such cases, the benefit of an art theft registry-the ability of
prospective purchasers to accurately determine which objects are stolen
prior to acquisition-are negated.
B. Applying the Discovery Rule to Past Thefts and Non-Registrable
Objects
The most equitable way to deal with the probrems of thefts that oc-
curred prior to the implementation of a registration requirement is to ap-
ply a strict discovery rule following the decision in Naftziger. Prior to
Naftziger, "' the California legislature had clearly spoken in an attempt to
deal with the problems of art and artifact theft." However, the theft at
has an identifying signature. For items such as lithographs or prints, the item must have some
type of identifying mark, such as an edition number. See Kisluk Interview, supra note 149.
186. Such as "Cliffs" and "Fragments," which were at issue in O'Keefe. See O'Keefe v.
Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 865 (N.J. 1980).
187. Such as the one at issue in Autocephalous, which the court was able to describe fairly
succinctly: "[the mosaic, made of small bits of colored glass, depicted Jesus Christ as a young
boy in the lap of his mother, the Virgin Mary, who was seated on a throne. Jesus and Mary
were attended by two archangels and surrounded by a frieze depicting the twelve apostles."
Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.,
917 F.2d 278, 279 (7th Cir. 1990).
188. For example, the 129 large copper cents stolen from the collection of 1,542 were sub-
stituted by identical, but inferior, cents by the thief. The theft was not discovered until the infe-
rior coins were examined by an expert. See Naftziger v. American Numismatic Soc'y, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1996). In this scenario, even individual photographs of the coins
would be unlikely to establish their identity. See supra note 185.
189. For example, a list prohibiting the importation of certain objects, the Archaeological
and Ethnographical Material from Peru, describes a variety of pre-Columbian artifacts that can-
not be imported. 62 Fed. Reg. 112 (1997) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12). Many of these
artifacts are generic household items, whose photograph or written description would be indis-
tinguishable from other members of its class.
190. This is assuming, of course, that the owners of the object had the foresight to photo-
graph the item.
191. See discussion supra Part lI.A.3.b.
192. The California statute of limitations states that "the cause of action in case of
theft.., of any article of historical, interpretive, scientific, or artistic significance is not
deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the whereabouts of the article by the aggrieved
party, his or her agent, or the law enforcement agency which originally investigated the theft."
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issue in Naftziger occurred prior to the enactment of the statute.191 The
court implied a discovery rule without a due diligence requirement into
the prior statute of limitations."9 The Naftziger court's decision provides
a solution to the problem of retroactivity: a clear-cut rule whereby the
cause of action does not begin to accrue against an owner of stolen art
until he or she becomes aware of the identity of the possessor of the ob-
ject, regardless of his or her diligence in searching for the object. Such a
rule would provide certainty and would protect the true victim of art
thefts: the original owner.
While there is no perfect solution as between two innocent parties, a
strict discovery rule ensures that victims of art theft will have an opportu-
nity to recover their art. As a matter of public policy, the victim of theft
should not be left without recourse.195 While the bona fide purchaser of
stolen art may recover from the individual or gallery who sold him or her
the artwork,' 96 the victim of theft has no such option. Admittedly, the
bona fide purchaser may be left without recourse depending on the facts
of the particular situation.' 97 However, the discovery rule will help re-
duce art theft and the trade in stolen art as a whole. Museums, galleries,
and individuals will thus be much more careful in their prospective pur-
chases of artworks. Since purchasers will know that they can be subject
to successful replevin actions if they buy stolen works, pieces that are
suspect will receive careful scrutiny, 98 and buyers will be hesitant to buy
any work for which valid title cannot be proven. Alternatively, the pro-
spective purchaser could demand title insurance from the gallery or auc-
tion house for the piece in question. In this scenario, the loss would be
allocated to the party who can most effectively investigate the artwork's
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c) (West Supp. 1996). The legislature thus seems to have spe-
cifically rejected a due diligence requirement.
193. See Naftziger, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 786.
194. See id.
195. Ultimately, the decision may boil down to who, of two entirely innocent parties,
should be awarded valid title to the artwork. Based on the long-standing Anglo-American legal
doctrine of relativity of title, the "first in time" true owner should recover his or her artwork in
preference to the subsequent purchaser.
196. For example, under a theory of breach of warranty of title. See U.C.C. § 2-312(a)
(1988) (stating that every sales contract includes a warranty of title).
197. One possible solution, where neither the true owner nor the bona fide purchaser are at
fault, would be to award the bona fide purchaser with a "salvor's award" for enabling the true
owner to recover his or her artwork. Admittedly, the situations where the equities would favor
such an award would be narrow. However, where the artwork has dramatically increased in
value since its loss, and the true owner would not have recovered the painting but for the actions
of the bona fide purchaser, some form of compensation for the bona fide purchaser may be justi-
fied.
198. Such as the mosaic in Autocephalous. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.a.
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chain of title.1" A strict discovery rule thus provides efficiency in the art
market by reducing the impetus for art theft and sales of stolen art, ul-
timately reducing the need for judicial involvement in art transactions.
Applying a strict discovery rule to non-registrable objects is differ-
ent. If an item is stolen after the enactment of an art theft registry re-
quirement, the true owner would be required to alert the registry of the
loss."1  However, if the true owner can demonstrate that the object was
not registrable, registration would be excused and a-strict discovery rule
applied to any resulting replevin action. The reason for this departure
from the general rule is simple. The policy behind an art theft registry
requirement is to provide certainty to art transactions by allowing pro-
spective purchasers to rely on the database's indication that a particular
object is not stolen. However, this policy should allow for the fact that
certain items are not registrable. Thus, the burden will be on the true
owner to demonstrate that the object was not subject to effective registra-
tion.'
Applying a strict discovery-rule to art stolen in the past and to non-
registrable objects is superior to the "demand and refusal" rule and to the
due diligence requirement. Both the demand and refusal rule and the due
diligence requirement bring uncertainty to the art market. The demand
and refusal rule as applied in art replevin actions is unfair to innocent
purchasers of stolen artworks, because it keeps the bona fide purchaser in
a constant state of vulnerability to suit.2 Under the demand and refusal
rule, the owner, even if aware of the identity of the current possessor, can
postpone suit indefinitely and still preserve his or her rights. The rule
brings uncertainty to transactions, and renders the statute of limitations
virtually meaningless. While the demand and refusal rule is a laudable
attempt to preserve the rights of the owners of stolen artworks, it goes too
199. This would thus force galleries and auction houses to confront the "hear-no-evil, see-
no-evil dilemma" which has played a major role in the trade in stolen art. See supra note 40
and accompanying text. If a gallery or auction house refused to warrant title to the artwork, the
purchaser would be advised to look elsewhere.
200. Of course, since the discovery rule will be applied prospectively only for non-
registrable objects, much of the theft deterrence will come from the registration requirement
itself. However, this distinction is not very significant, since both the discovery rule and the
registration requirement will make it harder for thieves to dispose of stolen art.
201. In the Bibas scenario, a true owner who failed to notify the registry of his or her loss
should lose as against a bone fide purchaser. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 2465-67. Since the
rationale behind an art theft registry is to alert prospective purchasers that the art is stolen, this
impetus will be lost unless the true owner has an incentive to notify the register. See id.
202. The "non-registrability" exception to the registration requirement should not be seen as
a loophole to benefit "lazy" owners who fail to register and spuriously claim that their artwork
was not registrable. The law should presume that all artworks are registrable. The true owner
could overcome this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.
203. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
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far. By placing the costs on the bona fide purchaser, the demand and re-
fusal rule unfairly places all the costs on one party.2
The due diligence requirement also brings uncertainty to the art mar-
ket, albeit by different means. While the demand and refusal rule brings
uncertainty to transactions, the due diligence requirement brings uncer-
tainty to case law as well. The requirement that a victim of theft be "dili-
gent" in searching for his or her artwork in order to preserve his or her
rights often seems reasonable at first. However, given the realities of the
art world,2 and the general lack of judicial guidelines as to what consti-
tutes due diligence, it is not. Additionally, public policy will often mili-
tate against a due diligence analysis for art stolen in the past.' Cases in-
dicate that due diligence is a fact specific analysis that varies from
situation to situation.2' Due diligence requires that the court make evi-
dentiary findings as to which party did what. Since courts have no clear
guidelines to follow, results will necessarily vary. Most significantly, the
common law rule that a thief cannot pass valid title is more likely to be
effectuated by a strict discovery rule than by the due dililgence require-
ment 0 8 The due diligence requirement and the demand and refusal rule
204. For example: a painting valued at $50 is stolen from Mr. A in 1950. In 1980, A
learns that it is being held by a museum, a bona fide purchaser. At the time, Mr. A does noth-
ing; perhaps the value of the painting does not make it worth his while to actively pursue its re-
turn. In 1990, learning that the painting is now valued at $30,000 and is about to be sold to a
private party, Mr. A demands its return-perhaps so he can make the sale himself. Under the
demand and refusal rule, Mr. A would prevail, even though he sat on his rights for ten years.
205. See supra notes 35-38, 40 and accompanying text.
206. For example: a painting is looted from the home of Mrs. B by the Nazis in 1939.
Mrs. B is now in her 80s and living in state X which has a statute of limitations of three years
for stolen property. Mrs. B. has heard rumors for the past five years that her painting is on dis-
play in a museum in state Y. Feeling that bringing suit is useless after so many years, she does
nothing, until 1997 when she sees her painting in the museum's catalogue. Then, at the urging
of her children, she brings suit in replevin. Should Mrs. B's suit (or that of her heirs) be barred
because she was not "diligent" in searching for the whereabouts of her painting when, to para-
phrase O'Keefe, she first "should have known of the identity of the possessor?" See also
Trescott, supra note 10 (noting the reluctance of many Holocaust survivors to talk about their
lost fortunes). The article reports a situation in which a family is suing the current owner for
possession of a work by Degas. As one family member put it "[m]y father couldn't talk about
[the loss of his family's artworks during World War II]." See id. As a matter of public policy,
so long as Mrs. B (or her heirs) can prove that she was the original owner of the painting, she
(or they) should win. The problems of proving ownership to art lost during and before World
War II are not necessarily as daunting as they seem; the Nazis often left accurate records of
what they took and where it was taken from. For example, the son of a family whose art was
taken by the Nazis was able to offer as proof of ownership the shipping documents "from the
truck drivers who hauled away his father's collection to Nazi offices." See Goldstein, supra
note 7.
207. See O'Keefe v. Snyder, 416 F.2d 862, 873 (N.J. 1980); Autocephalous Greek-
Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg, 917 F.2d 278, 290 (7th Cir. 1990).
208. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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are, in essence, on two opposite ends of the spectrum: the due diligence
requirement unfairly punishes victims of theft who have not comported
with its unclear standards, and the demand and refusal rule unfairly pun-
ishes bona fide purchasers by keeping them perpetually subject to suit.
A strict discovery rule is preferable to both the demand and refusal
rule and the due diligence requirement, since it sits in the middle of the
spectrum. It does not unfairly require owners to be diligent, nor does it
unfairly prejudice bona fide purchasers by keeping them perpetually sub-
ject to suit. A strict discovery rule, as applied in Naftziger, is a directive
which is both clear and easy to apply.' Once the owner becomes aware
of the identity of the possessor of the stolen artwork, he or she has a
specified time210 to bring action. If the owner does not bring action, the
title vests in the bona fide purchaser. The owner's action after discover-
ing the possessor's identity is the dispositive factor, rather than a
hindward looking analysis of whether the owner was "diligent" in
searching for the artwork. The discovery rule utilized in this context will
conserve judicial resources by negating a court's need to evaluate con-
flicting evidence as to whether the true owner was diligent. In addition,
cases in which a bona fide purchaser brings suit to establish title to a
painting, claiming that the true owner was not "diligent," would effec-
tively be barred altogether."' Furthermore, a strict discovery rule would
provide certainty in the art market, even in cases in which the theft pre-
dates specific art theft legislation. Finally, a uniform rule will reduce fo-
rum shopping.
Conclusion
Art theft has been around for a long time, and it is unlikely to go
away. Art theft has given rise to the dilemma of how to decide ownership
209. Thus, following Naftziger, Mrs. B gets her painting back. See supra note 206. Why
should others profit from Mrs. B's misfortune when the law can easily provide a remedy? -The
hypothetical case of Mrs. B is of increasing relevance. The question of how to determine own-
ership of items looted during World War II is becoming the subject of increasing litigation in
United States courts. See supra note 7.
210. Three years in California. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c) (West Supp. 1996).
211. Thus, situations such as that in Erisoty would be barred. See Erisoty v. Rizik, No.
Civ. A. 93-6215, 1995 WL 91406 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995). In Erisoty, three Corrado Gia-
quinto paintings were stolen from Souraya Rizik's home in Washington, D.C. in 1960. See id.
In 1988, a cleaning service found one of the paintings, "Winter," while cleaning out a home in
Philadelphia. See id. The owner of the cleaning service, Kern, consigned the painting to the
Slosberg auction house, who sold it to the Erisotys for $29,050. See id. The paintings were
recovered from the Erisotys by the FBI and returned to the Riziks. See id. The Erisotys then
brought an action against the Riziks seeking title to the painting. See id. The Erisotys. claimed
in essence that the Rizik's efforts to locate the painting were not sufficiently diligent to toll the
statute of limitations. See id.
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between two innocent parties: the owner, as victim of the theft, and the
innocent purchaser of the stolen artwork. Common law solutions to the
problem of when an art replevin action is barred by the statue of limita-
tions have produced conflicting requirements both for true owners and
bona fide purchasers. Judicial responses have been more of a Band-Aid
than a cure for the problems of art theft. They do not provide clear-cut
directives for parties and other courts to follow, nor do they provide in-
centives that will help stem the flourishing illicit art market.
Legislation that requires victims of art theft to register their stolen
works and/or that requires purchasers to do a title search in order to pre-
serve their rights is desirable." 2 Such legislation would serve to hinder
the illicit art market and would thus reduce art theft in the future. It
would provide clear-cut guidelines that courts, institutions, and individu-
als could follow. However, legislation that imposes an affirmative duty
for art theft victims to register their stolen works could not be equitably
applied retroactively to the great deal of art which has already been sto-
len. In addition, certain objects are not registrable. What are necessary
to deal with the problems of prospective retroactivity and non-
registrability, which will arise after the implementation of such legisla-
tion, are clear-cut guidelines that provide certainty to art replevin actions.
Applying a strict discovery rule following Naftziger, so that the cause of
action for victims of art theft does not begin to accrue until the owner dis-
covers the identity of the possessor of the artwork, is the best solution to
the problem of prospective retroactivity. A strict discovery rule applied
in this context is superior to other common law doctrines because it pro-
tects victims of art theft from losing their right of action to the nebulous,
hindward looking analysis of due diligence. It is fairer to bona fide pur-
chasers than the demand and refusal rule, since it does not allow owners
to sit on their rights indefinitely. Thus, once an owner becomes aware of
the identity of the possessor of the art, he or she would have to bring a
replevin action within a prescribed period or lose his or her rights to the
art. Finally, a strict discovery rule will provide certainty to an area of
law which can most accurately be described as confused.
212. Such as legislation following that proposed by Bibas, supra note 2, at 2439, or Haw-
kins et al., supra note 2, at 90-93.
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